Doctrine Of Colourable Legislation And Article 13

The doctrine of colorable legislation concerns the legislature's competence in enacting a piece of legislation. According to this doctrine, if a legislature is forbidden from doing something, it may not do so under the guise or pretence of doing something while acting within its lawful jurisdiction, and this prohibition is an implied result of the maxim "what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly."

 

The true nature and character, or pith and substance, of the legislation determines whether the Legislature has stayed within the jurisdiction assigned to it or has encroached upon a forbidden field. The main point is that a legislature with limited authority cannot cross the line into the realm of competence. It's referred to as "constitutional fraud."

While explaining the doctrine in the case of K.C Gajapati vs. State of Orissa, the Supreme Court stated that "if the constitution of a state distributes the legislative spheres marked out by specific legislative entriesor if there are limitations on legislative authority in the form of fundamental rights, questions aloneise as to whether the legislature in a particular case in respect to the subject" Such transgressions can be open, obvious, and direct, but they can also be hidden, covered, and indirect, and the term "colorable legislation" has been used in some judicial decisions to describe the latter. The Supreme Court of India has established certain tests to determine the true nature of legislation impeached as colorable in various judicial pronouncements: -

 

• The court must consider the substance of the challenged law rather than its form or the label given by the legislature. The court will look at two things when determining the substance of an enactment: a) the effect of the legislation and b) the act's object and purpose.

 

• The doctrine of colorable legislation has nothing to do with the law's motivation; it is, in essence, a question of the legislature's power to enact the law in question.

 

If the legislature is competent to enact a specific law, the motivation that prompted it to do so is irrelevant. The Apex court, on the other hand, stated that "the legislature's motive in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny of the courts," and that the court has no authority to scrutinise the policy that led to the enactment of a law within the scope of the legislature concerned. There are very few cases where a law has been declared invalid by a court due to the legislature's lack of competence. 

 

The only time this has happened is when a state law dealing with the abolition of the landlord system provided for payment of compensation based on the landlord's rent income. Rent arrears due to the landlord prior to the acquisition date were to vest in the state, with half of the arrears going to the landlord as compensation. The provision was found to be a piece of tainted legislation and thus null and void on the following grounds:

 

• That the impugned act was not within the legislative authority of the Bihar state legislature.

 

• The act was unconstitutional because the estate acquisitions were not for a public purpose.

 

• That the legislative power was abused by the executive in various sections of the act, and that this abuse of power was unconstitutional.

 

• That the act was unconstitutional and that certain parts of it were unenforceable due to their vagueness and ambiguity.

 

There is always a presumption that the legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction (ut res magis, valet quamparret), and the burden of proving that an act is not within the legislature's competence or that it has violated other constitutional mandates is always on the person challenging its vires.

 

In the end, colorable legislation indicates that the legislature exceeded its authority while enacting the law. However, it could be argued that whether parliament can do something indirectly that it can't do directly depends on why it can't do it directly. There are numerous examples in law and life where something can be accomplished indirectly rather than directly. As a result, the true principle of colorable legislation is that "what is prohibited directly cannot be done indirectly."