The Saiyids And Farrukh Siyar

In the absence of the Mir Bakshi, Abdullah Khan had struggled to maintain his position against the Emperor's favourites, particularly Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Dauran. Both of these men had been close to Farrukh Siyar and, despite their lack of ability or experience in high office, desired to wield absolute power by deposing the Saiyids. 

 

•    The Saiyids, like Zulfiqar Khan before them, wanted to keep all the major levers of power in their hands, and they demanded that “no business be transacted, mansabs and appointments be made without their advice and consultation.” Khan (Khafi) Khan (Khafi Khan) Khan (Khafi The Emperor's favourite argued that the wazir and the Mir Bakhshi should recognise their limits of power and not act without the Emperor's approval and concurrence.

 

•    These two opposing views on the nature of the wizarat resulted in a series of crises during which the Saiyids gradually gained power until they were able to depose Farrukh Siyar and install their own candidate on the throne. This struggle became a focal point for all issues, exacerbating the jagirdari system's crisis and straining nobles' devotion to the Mughal throne.

 

•    The interference of royal favourites in the wazir's sphere of administration was the immediate cause of the crisis. Farrukh Siyar gave Mir Jumla permission to sign all of his documents on his behalf, declaring that "Mir Jumla's word and seal are my word and seal." 

 

•    Mir Jumla began accepting proposals for mansabs and promotions and stamping them with the imperial seal without going through the diwan-i-office. wizarat's This was against all rules of procedure, and it cost the wazir money by depriving him of his perquisites for appointments.

 

•    The situation was made worse because Abdullah Khan, who was primarily a soldier, had entrusted all state affairs to his deputy, Ratan Chand. Ratan Chand was not inept, but he was haughty and overbearing, and he would do nothing unless he and his master, Abdullah Khan, were offered a suitable bribe. 

 

•    Mir Jumla avoided these practises and was also punctual in his business dealings.

 

•    Ratan Chand's use of ijara was another source of dissatisfaction for Farrukh Siyar (revenue farming). Even khalisa lands were sold to the highest bidder. Ratan Chand would take a contract or lease in writing from an amil whenever one was appointed, and realise the money from his banker, i.e. one who had stood surety for the contract. 

 

•    Ijara was considered ruinous by custom and tradition, and Farrukh Siyar had forbidden it. However, ijara, which had become widespread under Jahandar Shah, was partly a reaction to the administration's growing breakdown.

 

•    The zamindars withheld revenue, and the area around Delhi was afflicted by a famine at the start of Farrukh Siyar's reign. “The scarcity of food-grains reached a limit that nobody had ever seen or heard in the past,” according to a contemporary.

 

•    Mir Jumla took advantage of these circumstances to convince Farrukh Siyar that the Saiyids were unfit for high office and that there would be no peace or prosperity in the empire as long as they were in charge. He also accused them of being haughty and self-centered, as well as of undermining the Emperor's prestige by disobeying his orders.

 

•    Farrukh Siyar began bolstering the military power of his favourites, Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Duaran, in order to overpower the Saiyids and force them to voluntarily relinquish their positions. A number of their relatives were also pushed forward, resulting in each of them commanding over 10,000 men.

 

•    When Husain Ali returned from Marwar, he found himself in this situation. The Saiyids concluded after much deliberation that they would not be able to maintain their position at the court unless they had control and resources over one of the more important subahs. 

 

•    As a result, Husain Ali demanded and was appointed Viceroy of the Deccan in place of Nizam-ul-Mulk. His plan was to appoint a deputy, as Zulfiqar Khan had done previously, and then stay at the court himself. Farrukh Siyar and his supporters correctly objected that putting three powerful positions in one family - wazir, mir bakhshi, and viceroy of the Deccan - would be dangerous and undesirable. 

 

•    As a result, Farrukh Siyar instructed Husain Ali to travel to the Deccan on his own. He also put off issuing the farman appointing Ajit Singh as Gujarat governor.

 

•    There is now a crisis. The Saiyids retreated to their homes, fearful of an attack by the Emperor's supporters, and military preparations began on both sides. But the royal favourites, Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Dauran, refused to fight the Saiyids because they "were only carpet knights, not true fighters," as one contemporary put it. 

 

•    It was attempted to persuade M. Amin Khan, the second bakhshi and Nizam-ul-cousin, Mulk's to take on the task. M. Amin Khan was ready, but he demanded the wizarat in exchange. The Emperor and his companions believed that getting rid of him would be even more difficult after that.

 

•    Finally, thanks to the Emperor's mother's intervention, a compromise was reached. Husain Ali was to travel to the Deccan to take personal charge of the situation. Mir Jumla, who had been appointed governor of Bihar and possibly Bengal, would be in charge of the province personally. 

 

•    The Saiyids also agreed that Khan-i-Dauran, one of the Emperor's favourites, be made acting Mir Bakshi. In the middle of May 1714, Husain Ali set sail for the Deccan. He had the power to appoint and dismiss all jagirdars and office holders in the Deccan, as well as the authority to transfer fort commandants. 

 

•    The Emperor had previously zealously guarded these rights as his prerogative. Transferring these rights to the Viceroy of the Deccan must be viewed as the first step in the Deccan's separation from the Empire.

 

•    Farrukh Siyar sent secret instructions to Daud Khan Panni, the governor of Gujarat, transferring him to Burhanpur and instructing him to resist Husain Ali as soon as Husain Ali's back was turned. 

 

•    Forced marches brought Daud Khan to Burhanpur, where he met Husain Ali on the battlefield. Husain Ali triumphed easily and obtained the secret letters sent to Daud Khan by Farrukh Siyar, providing further proof to the Saiyids of their master's duplicity.

 

 

•    As a result, the first strength test yielded no results. If anything, it made the Saiyids aware of their vulnerability and motivated them to seek allies wherever they could. 

 

•    Farrukh Siyar addressed the old nobles, particularly the group led by M. Amin Khan, Nizam-ul-Mulk, and their associates. He also tried to enlist the help of Ajit Singh, Jai Singh, and Maharaja Sangram II. Thus, at Jai Singh's request, Banswara, Dungarpur, and other cities were returned to the Rana's control. 

 

•    Farrukh Siyar granted the Rana permission to assist his mother in making a pilgrimage to Garh Mukteshwar. Farrukh Siyar responded with a gracious farman, assuring the Maharana's mother's safety. The Rana was also given other concessions.

 

•    Despite the fact that Jai Singh had been appointed governor of Malwa at the request of the Saiyids, he had gradually distanced himself from them. This was due to Saiyid intervention in the Kota-Bundi dispute against Budh Singh, Jai Singh's protege and son-in-law, and Saiyid support for Churaman Jat, who was attempting to carve out a principality on the Amber borders, which Jai Singh had his eye on.

 

•    After a significant victory over the Marathas in 1714, when he drove the Marathas across the Narmada at great cost, Jai Singh's ambitions grew. He also preferred to deal directly with the Emperor rather than the wazir, as was customary. 

 

•    In the middle of 1716, Jai Singh appeared in court in response to Farrukh Siyar's repeated and urgent summons. Bhim Singh was first expelled from Bundi, and Budh Singh was later reinstated. After that, Jai Singh was chosen to lead a campaign against the Jats. Abdullah Khan was not even asked for his opinion on the matter.

 

•    In the meantime, the internal crisis grew worse. Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri, who had worked under Aurangzeb but had gone to Mecca after his son, Sadullah Khan, was executed at the start of FarrukhSiyar's reign, returned. 

 

•    Inayatullah was appointed as diwan of tan (salaries) and khalisa by Farrukh Siyar, who was now eager to win over the old Alamgiri nobles to his side. 

 

•    Inayatullah Khan worked closely with the wazir, Abdullah Khan, for a time, but the two soon fell out. Jizyah was reimposed at the request of Inayatullah Khan, who produced a letter from the Sharif of Mecca stating that levying jizyah on non-Muslims was "obligatory," much to Abdullah Khan's chagrin.

 

•    Inayatullah Khan then attempted to address the issue of jagirs, which was causing increasing dissatisfaction among the khanzads, or scions of the old nobles. He looked at the salaries and yields of the jagirs and proposed putting aside the mansabs of those who had accumulated mansabs beyond their deserts through force and cunning by laying their hands on the most productive jagirs. Men of low ranks, whether diwani, bakhshi, or khan samani, were identified as "Hindus and eunuchs and Kashmiris" and "Hindus and eunuchs and Kashmiris." 

 

•    As a result, according to Khafi Khan and Mirza Muhammad, contemporary historians, “there was a scarcity of jagirs for the others.” People from long-dead families had been reduced to ashes.”

 

•    The issue of jagir shortages and khanazad dissatisfaction had become prominent in Aurangzeb's later years, and had steadily worsened, as we have seen. 

 

•    As a result, the issue of the grant of jagirs, particularly the productive one, became a focal point of party struggle at the court. Ratan Chand opposed these reforms because he had the support and backing of the administration's lower ranks, as well as Hindustanis as opposed to Turanis and Iranis, or the old nobles, and Abdullah Khan refused to implement them at his request.

 

•    Meanwhile, Jai Singh was unable to gain a decisive victory after fourteen months of close investment in the Jat stronghold of Thun. Over the head of Jai Singh, Abdullah Khan negotiated a settlement with the Jat leader Churaman. The Jat leader agreed to pay the state 50 lakhs in cash and goods, as well as a 20 lakh private gift to the wazir. He also gave up his strongholds, such as Thun and Dig. His mansab and dominance over many areas in the neighbourhood were implicitly accepted in exchange. The Saiyids' benefit from the agreement with Churaman was dubious. 

 

•    As they would learn later, Churaman was a fickle companion. Churaman had been a supporter of Azim-ush-Shan in Lahore, but his role was to plunder. He was with Jahandar Shah in Agra, but when the tide of battle turned against him, he was the first to plunder. 

 

•    Furthermore, Jai Singh felt cheated out of success as a result of the agreement. This created a clear schism between him and the Saiyids, which the Saiyids later regretted and attempted to heal, but to no avail.

 

•    Husain Ali's agreement with Shahu, on the other hand, gave the Saiyids a significant advantage. Husain Ali had refused to accept Daud Khan Panni's agreement for the payment of chauth and sardeshmukhi of the Deccan to the Marathas in a lump sum after his arrival in the Deccan, following the policy of Nizam-ul-Mulk. As a result, the war with the Marathas resurfaced, plundering and destroying everything in their path. 

 

•    In each pargana, the Marathas had built small mud forts (garhis) to which they would retreat when pressed. Imperialists would never be able to destroy these garhis. 

 

•    The underhanded opposition of Farrukh Siyar, who wrote letters to Shahu as well as zamindars and diwans in Karnataka to oppose Husain Ali, made matters even more difficult. Husain Ali's authority in Bijapur, Haiderabad, and Karnataka had been "reduced almost to a cypher" as a result of this. 'Khafi Khan' means 'Khafi Khan' in Arabic.

 

•    In these circumstances, Husain Ali began negotiations with Shahuthrough Shankarji Malhar, who had worked under Shivaji and was a sachiv (minister) under Raja Ram, and had joined Husain Ali at Delhi after settling down in Banaras.

 

•    After lengthy negotiations, an agreement was reached in February 1718, giving Shahu the right to collect chauth and sardeshmukhi in the Deccan through his own agents. He was also given Shivaji's swarajya, as well as confirmation of recent Maratha conquests in Berar, Gondwana, and Karnataka.

 

•    In exchange, Shahu agreed to pay a ten-lakh rupee peshkash, maintain a body of 15,000 horses to be displaced at the Viceroy Deccan's disposal, populate the country, and punish malfectors. Shahu agreed to pay over one crore rupees in customary fees in exchange for the grant of sardeshmukhi.

 

•    Even without the Emperor's approval, Husain Ali granted Shahu sanads in accordance with the agreement. Farrukh Siyar, when approached, rejected the deal, claiming that “it was not proper for the vile enemy (i.e. the Marathas) to be overbearing partners in matters of revenue and government.” 

 

•    The objection was valid, but Farrukh Siyar had brought the problems upon himself through his meddling with his former wazir and Mir Bakhshi. Farrukh Siyar took a number of steps in desperation to thwart Husain Ali's likely move against him. M. Amin Khan, a Turani leader and Nizam-ul-cousin, Mulk's was sent to Malwa to assist Jai Singh and check the "oppressors," in reality to block Husain Ali's path to Delhi. A number of appointments were made to Burhanpur in violation of Husain Ali's agreement, in order to weaken Husain Ali's control over the area.

 

•    Finally, he summoned Ajit Singh, Nizam-ul-Mulk, and Sarbuland Khan, the Emperor's maternal grand-uncle and governor of Bihar, as well as a noted warrior, to court. 

 

•    These elderly nobles were requested to arrive "with a large following." The combined strength of the various Rajas and nobles, as well as the Emperor's personal following (walashahis), was estimated to be between 70 and 80,000 horses. 

 

•    Every time the Emperor went on a hunt, Abdullah Khan increased the number of soldiers at his disposal, and it was rumoured that this would be used as an excuse to attack Abdullah Khan. His total force, including Barahas and non-Barahas, was estimated to be between fifteen and thirty thousand men. Farrukh Siyar could have deposed the wazir if he had been able to keep the coalition together. 

 

•    Farrukh Siyar's pusillanimity and shortsightedness, as well as his fear that if he ousted the Saiyids with the help of these powerful nobles, it would be even more difficult to get rid of them later, prevented this from happening. 

 

•    As a result, Farrukh Siyar chose Muhammad Murad Kashmiri, a newly risen favourite who was quickly promoted to the rank of 7000/7000 and given the best jagirs in the provinces of Gujarat, Delhi, and Agra. Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Dauran, two of his old favourites, had been discarded by this point. Mir Jumla had completely failed in Bihar, and he had come to Delhi without royal permission after failing to pay his soldiers and control the province's tumultuous zamindars. 

 

•    Farrukh Siyar had resumed his mansab and jagirs, which were only restored after Abdullah Khan intervened. With Abdullah Khan's support, he was appointed Sadr of Lahore. It was suggested that Khan-i-Dauran had formed a secret alliance with the Saiyids and had revealed to them all of the Emperor's secret plots against them.

 

•    Muhammad Murad's association with young boys earned him a bad reputation. The old nobles were envious of his rise and withdrew their support for Farrukh Siyar as a result. In the meantime, Abdullah Khan gained the trust of Nizam-ul-Mulk and Sarbuland Khan by securing high positions for them. 

 

•    Farrukh Siyar removed Ajit Singh from Gujarat on a charge of oppression, which alienated him. As a result, when Ajit Singh arrived at court, he sided with the wazir.

 

•    With the exception of Jai Singh's support, Farrukh Siyar was completely isolated when Husain Ali left Aurangabad for Delhi in late 1718, accompanied by 10,000 Maratha troops under the command of the Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath. 

 

•    Husain Ali's justification for visiting Delhi was that he had obtained a (fictitious) son of Prince Akbar from Shahu and wanted to give him to FarrukhSiyar.

 

•    We won't go into the details of what led to Farrukh Siyar's deposition in February 1719 and assassination in captivity a few months later. Husain Ali was backed up in the deposition by M. Amin Khan and Ajit Singh. It was even favoured by Khan-i-Dauran. 

 

•    Abdullah Khan, on the other hand, believed that keeping Farrukh Siyar on the throne was unnecessary because the fort was completely under the control of the Saiyids' men, and all posts close to the Emperor were held by their nominees or were about to be handed over to them soon.

 

•    However, public opinion in the city was tense, and 2,000 Marathas troopers were killed in the process, with the rest forced to flee. With 20,000 horsemen, Jai Singh was loitering 20 kos from Delhi, and it would be difficult to control the situation if some of the city's nobles joined him. Meanwhile, Farrukh Siyar has put off handing over all of the Saiyids' demanded posts to their nominees.

 

•    Whatever the issues, Farrukh Siyar's detention and subsequent assassination was a blunder and a crime from which the Saiyids would never recover.

 

•    After the deposition, they were regarded as tyrants and traitors to the salt, rather than brave individuals fighting against an ungrateful master for the preservation of their lives and honour. 

 

•    It also paved the way for the Turani nobles known as the "Chin" to emerge as defenders of the Timurid monarchy and the faith that was in danger of being sullied.