The Post-independence Foreign Policy

After 1947, India's attempt to pursue an independent foreign policy was a high point in world politics. This policy was marked by a great deal of consistency and continuity, as a result of its long history and recent past. Despite revolutionary changes in the international situation, the broad parameters established during the independence struggle and early years of independence remain valid. Jawaharlal Nehru is credited with designing this significant achievement. 

 

•    Nehru realized India could not help but aspire to the right to speak in her own voice, given her great civilization. Her recent, hard-won independence from colonialism would be meaningless if it did not find expression in the international arena. India's subcontinental size also ruled out the assumption of client status.

 

•    It was not only a choice, but a necessity to have an independent voice. Through the non-aligned movement, Nehru gave this voice shape in the form of the idea of nonalignment and organizational cohesion. 

•    The division of the world into two hostile blocs following World War II, one led by the US and western powers and the other led by the Soviet Union, provided the immediate context for the emergence of this movement. 

 

•    Nehru believed that newly independent, poor Asian and African countries had nothing to gain and everything to lose by succumbing to the temptation of joining the big powers' military blocs. They'd end up being used as pawns in power struggles that had no bearing on them. Their needs were to combat poverty, illiteracy, and disease, none of which could be met by joining military alliances. 

 

•    India and other similarly situated countries, on the other hand, required peace and quiet in order to get on with the business of development. Their goals were to expand the 'area of peace,' not to expand the 'area of war,' or to expand the 'area of hostility.' As a result, India did not join or approve the Baghdad Pact, the Manila Treaty, SEATO, or CENTO, which brought countries from West and East Asia into the western power bloc.

 

•    India, on the other hand, went far beyond neutrality and staying out of military alliances. Nehru was quick to dismiss John Foster Dulles' charge of "immoral neutrality" levelled at India. Non-alignment meant being able to decide each issue on its own merits, to weigh what was right and wrong, and then to take a stand in favor of what was right. 

 

•    The struggle of India and other newly independent nations to maintain and strengthen their independence from colonialism and imperialism became known as non-alignment. India, as the first country to achieve independence, rightfully led the way for other former colonies in this regard. And these countries had a lot of clout as a group. 

 

•    In the United Nations, for example, where membership had swelled as a result of their entry, the one-country, one-vote system allowed the non-aligned bloc, aided by the Soviets, to check the western bloc's dominance. As a result, non-alignment aided the democratization of international relations. 

 

•    Extending support to colonial and ex-colonial countries in their fight against colonialism. It also made it easier to achieve another goal, which was to promote world peace. Nehru's vehement opposition to war and the threat of nuclear war that loomed large after Hiroshima is well documented. 

 

•    It arose from his experience of nonviolent struggle and his belief in Gandhi, who had made it his mission to combat and outlaw the atomic bomb. Nehru, inspired by Gandhi and backed by great intellectuals such as Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, made it India's mission to bring peace, nuclear disarmament, and general disarmament to the world's attention.

 

•    Chairman Mao is said to have told Nehru in a conversation around the same time that Nehru was warning about the dangers of world extinction due to nuclear conflict that a future nuclear war was just another stage in the inevitable march towards socialism, and that if 300 million Chinese died in it, another 300 million would survive! Nehru insisted on the peaceful coexistence of countries with different ideologies and systems, and he believed that no one had a monopoly on the truth and that pluralism was a fact of life. 

 

•    Also called five principles of peaceful coexistence, as a framework for international relations. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence were among the principles agreed upon. 

 

•    While Nehru tirelessly expressed his views on national conduct in international forums, there were some watershed moments in his quest. 

 

•    Prior to independence, in March 1947, he convened an Asian Relations Conference in Delhi, which drew more than twenty countries. The conference's theme was Asian independence and assertiveness on the global stage. 

 

•    While this conference focused on broad issues, the following one was convened in response to a very specific issue: the Dutch attempt to recolonize Indonesia in December 1948. 

 

•    Nehru invited states that bordered the Indian Ocean, and the majority of Asian countries, as well as Australia, attended. The conference decided to deny Dutch shipping all facilities and sent its resolutions to the United Nations. Within a week, the Security Council had decided on a cease-fire and the restoration of Indonesia's national government. 

 

•    The decolonization initiative was furthered at the Asian leaders' conference in Colombo in 1954 and the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, both called by India and other Colombo powers.

 

•    The conference also served as a warm-up for the Non-Aligned Movement Conference in Belgrade, as it passed resolutions on world peace and nuclear weapons dangers. Nehru's efforts reached a pinnacle in 1961, when he stood alongside Egypt's Nasser and Yugoslavia's Tito in Belgrade to call for nuclear disarmament and peace. By this time, he was convinced that the remnants of colonialism would soon crumble, and the world's next challenge would be to avoid a nuclear war. 

 

•    Main objective is to promote and protect Indian economic interests while also assisting her in following the path she had chosen. Non-alignment allowed India to develop economic ties with countries on both sides of the divide as and when she needed them because she was not tied to any one bloc. 

 

•    She required capital, technology, machinery, and food from western countries, which she obtained. She also relied on the Soviet Union to build up her public sector industries, especially after 1954, something that the US was hesitant to do.

 

•    India was able to obtain defense equipment from a wide range of sources, demonstrating that it was able to maintain sufficiently friendly relations with a large number of countries. By casting a wide net, she avoided becoming overly reliant on any one country, and she was able to negotiate better deals because potential partners were aware of her competitors.

 

•    Many of the inherent weaknesses of a newly independent, underdeveloped, and impoverished country were mitigated in this way. In a similar vein, India has maintained active membership in a number of UN bodies, as well as the IMF and the World Bank.

 

•    It is a testament to India's economic diplomacy that she has received the most concessional funding from multilateral international agencies in absolute terms (rather than per capita). Indian foreign policy has been known to link seemingly incompatible goals. 

 

•    For example, the Soviet Union and India began negotiations in 1963 and signed major arms deals in August 1964, August 1965, and November 1965, making the Soviet Union India's largest arms supplier and catapulting Indo-Soviet relations into a qualitatively new phase. At the same time, India decided to adopt the US-backed Green Revolution technology for agricultural development. 

 

•    The arms deals with the Soviet Union and the Green Revolution, which saw India become food self-sufficient in a matter of years, increased India's ability to stand on her own two feet and take a more independent stance in international affairs. Similarly, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to be paid in rupees at different times, saving India valuable hard currency.

 

•    India also maintained an active presence in multilateral organizations, seeking to maximize the value of its membership. For this reason, Nehru chose to remain in the Commonwealth soon after independence. Despite widespread public opinion to the contrary, he believed that once India was independent and there was no longer any threat of British dominance, India could benefit from her membership in a multilateral organization. 

 

•    In addition, being a member of the Commonwealth provided some security in a situation where India had yet to determine who her friends (and enemies) would be. India also participated actively in UN peacekeeping missions around the world, often at a high cost to Indian lives. A closer examination of some of the international situations in which India was involved would shed light on the difficult tasks imposed by her non-aligned foreign policy.

 

•    Korean War-After World War II, Korea was divided into a Communist North controlled by the Socialist camp and a Western-dominated South Korea.

 

•    When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, India backed the United States in the United Nations Security Council, denouncing North Korea as an aggressor and calling for a ceasefire. However, the Americans' delight quickly turned to rage when they discovered that India had abstained from voting on another resolution calling for assistance to South Korea and the establishment of a unified command to do so. The main concern of India was to keep outside powers out of the conflict. Nehru appealed to both Truman and Stalin, who both responded positively.

 

•    At this point, Nehru attempted to end the war by convening a conference, but the US thwarted his efforts with an ill-timed UN resolution declaring China the aggressor. 

 

•    India voted against it because the aggressor in North Korea was clearly MacArthur, not China. Despite India's tireless efforts, it took until June 1953 for both sides to agree to a ceasefire and develop an acceptable formula for the repatriation of prisoners of war. 

 

•    The Korean War had put India's commitment to non-alignment and peace to the test, and she had passed with flying colors. She stood firm in the face of Chinese and Soviet hostility after voting to declare North Korea the aggressor. She was then chastised by the United States for refusing to support western intervention in the war and for refusing to declare China the aggressor. 

 

•    In the midst of this, China invaded and annexed Tibet in 1950, with no attempt to keep India in the picture. Despite his disappointment, Nehru did not let it affect his stance on the Korean War. India persisted in pressuring the United Nations to recognize Communist China and give it a seat on the Security Council, especially now that the USSR had withdrawn in protest. 

 

•    India also required food aid from the United States to alleviate near-famine conditions at home, but it did not allow this to blind it to the United States' policy in Korea. She persisted in her efforts, despite the fact that success was not always apparent. In the end, India's position was vindicated, and both sides were forced to acknowledge the same boundary they had attempted to alter. 

 

•    The world had finally realized the value of non-alignment. It was difficult to dismiss it as cowardly neutrality or idealist nonsense because it was so mealy-mouthed. The Soviet Union began to see India in a new light. Bulganin, the Soviet Prime Minister, even told K.P.S. Menon, the Indian ambassador, that the USSR "fully appreciated India's position in the Commonwealth and hoped that India would continue to remain in it." This was a significant shift from the time when joining the Commonwealth was seen as conclusive proof of India's submission to western imperialism!

 

•    The end of the Korean War brought Asia only a brief respite. Early in 1954, Indo-China appeared to be on the verge of becoming the next holy crusade against Communism, with the US eager to pour massive aid into the weary and hesitant French colonial power in its ongoing (since 1945) war with the Viet Minh. 

 

•    Nehru's appeal for a cease-fire in February 1954 was followed by his securing the support of several Asian leaders for his six-point proposal for a settlement at the Colombo Conference in April 1954. Krishna Menon was dispatched to the Geneva Conference on Indo-China Relations to explain the Asian perspective (to which India was not invited as a member). 

 

•    India obtained guarantees from China for the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia, as well as promises from the United Kingdom and France to China that they would not allow the United States to establish bases in those countries. 

 

•    India was appointed Chairman of the International Control Commission at China's request, and its responsibilities included overseeing the import of foreign armaments into Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The risk of the Chinese intervening on behalf of the Viet Minh and the US increasing its support for the French, even to the point of introducing nuclear weapons into the region, has been averted for the time being. 

 

•    France was tired of the war, Britain was wary of belligerent US intentions, and the USSR was groping for ‘peaceful coexistence,' especially after Stalin's death. While the control commissions were later overturned by US diplomacy, and Indo-China became a major Cold War battleground, all subsequent peace efforts essentially adopted Nehru's solutions.

 

•    Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, in an impulsive response to US and British pressure to abandon its declared policy of nonalignment, the most recent move being the Anglo-American withdrawal of promised financial aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile River. 

 

•    The canal's users were alarmed, and Britain and France, in particular, demanded international control of the canal. India was a major user, but she recognized that the Suez Canal was an integral part of Egypt under the Constantinople Convention (1888). She urged both Cairo and London to exercise restraint, and at the London Conference in August 1956, she attempted to reach an agreement on a formula that included Egyptian control, a user advisory role, and dispute resolution based on the UN Charter. 

 

•    The Indian proposal was well-received by the international community, including Egypt. Later, when France and Britain persuaded Israel to attack Egypt and land troops in Suez, they were roundly condemned by the United Nations and Nehru, who referred to it as "naked aggression" and a "reversion to colonial methods." 

 

•    The withdrawal was overseen by the United Nations, and Indian troops made up a sizable part of the peacekeeping force. India continued to support Egyptian interests in subsequent negotiations leading to a settlement, while also attempting to protect the interests of British and other users. Even Britain eventually accepted India's approach as fair, and the episode had no lasting impact on Indo-British relations.

 

•    Hungary-The UN strongly condemned the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary in October 1956 to crush a rebellion aimed at forcing Hungary out of the Soviet bloc and demanded its withdrawal. India was heavily chastised in the West for refusing to join in this formal condemnation. While the Soviets must withdraw, India's position was that the situation was not as straightforward as the West made it out to be. 

 

•    The existence of two zones of influence in Europe, West and East, was a fact of life in the post-World War II era, and any disruption could trigger a domino effect. There was no point in humiliating the Soviets through formal condemnation, which India avoided as a matter of policy because it only hardened positions and made future compromise more difficult. 

 

•    To show his dissatisfaction with the Soviet action, Nehru did not send an ambassador to Budapest for two years. When the issue of Kashmir came up again in the UN Security Council, the Soviets retaliated by abstaining. They then went back to their old habit of vetoing resolutions that were detrimental to India's interests! India was in a difficult situation, but she stood firm under pressure from both sides and did not sway in either direction.

 

•    The Congo- India's contribution to the integrity and independence of Congo was a major achievement in Indian foreign policy. Congo had only recently gained independence from Belgium when its copper-rich province of Katanga declared independence from the Congo on June 30, 1960! 

 

•    'Thank God for India,' Dag Hammarskjold is said to have said, and the praise was well-deserved. It was a watershed moment for India's non-alignment policy, aid to newly independent African and Asian countries, and strengthening of multilateral institutions like the United Nations. 

 

•    Non-alignment could work again, and there was not only room but also a need for the non-aligned to assert themselves on the side of newly-emerging nations. They were sought after by eager superpowers for enlistment in a project that would only serve to take away their freedom before they had a chance to taste it.

 

•    Non-alignment between the United States and India did not preclude, but rather encouraged, a friendly relationship with the United States, the world's leading power after WWII. India required technology, machines, and aid for its development efforts, as well as food for its people and moral support for its nation-building and democratic efforts, all of which it believed the United States could provide. 

 

•    The US position on Kashmir, on the other hand, has shattered this bond of friendship. Even after the UN Commission reported the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir, the UN Security Council, dominated by the US and its allies, dragged its feet on a decision on the Indian charge of Pakistani aggression in the late 1940s and early 1950s. All favorable findings by UN mediators were ignored, and the powerful western media was used to spread the myth that India was not following UN directives.

 

•    Indian requests for food aid were put on hold because, according to legend, Nehru never asked for it during his 1949 visit to the United States, despite the fact that he had detailed explained the drought situation. Only after China and the USSR stepped in to assist were shipments sent! The United States was not pleased with India's recognition of communist China in early 1950, nor with India's demand that the People's Republic of China be granted UN representation. 

 

•    India's initial stance on the Korean War was praised, but her later stance was criticized. Pakistan was offered military assistance as early as 1952, though it was not made public until 1953. It was ostensibly given arms to combat a Soviet Communist threat, but the weapons it received were incapable of crossing the Hindu Kush and could only be used against India. 

 

•    The US dismissed Indian concerns with meaningless assurances that they would not be used against India. Nehru expressed his displeasure with the Cold War being brought to the subcontinent by Pakistan's inclusion in CENTO, SEATO, and other organizations. 

 

•    The United States' portrayal of nonalignment as immoral didn't help matters either. The US also showed complete indifference to Indian concerns in Goa. They backed Portugal's claim that Goa was a province of Portugal in 1955, and India retaliated vehemently when India liberated Goa by force in 1961, after waiting fourteen years for independence.

 

•    The very different perceptions of the Cold War were, of course, a major factor in the tense relationship between the world's two great democracies. The United States was obsessed with Communism and could not accept that others had different priorities. 

 

•    India had also encouraged other Asian and African countries to remain non-aligned. It has been suggested, quite convincingly, that US antipathy toward India predates India's refusal to side with it in the Cold War, and that the US establishment inherited, including via British intelligence officials who helped set up the CIA, the British dislike of the Congress leaders who brought down the mighty Empire, as well as a positive attitude toward the Muslim League/ Pakistan because it was pro-India. 

 

•    This is not to say that the relationship between India and the United States has always been tense. People to people relations, on the other hand, remained friendly. As the US became a source of technology and machines, economic ties grew. Relations improved significantly in the late 1950s, at least in part because the US gained a better understanding of Indian policy and perhaps because greater Soviet friendship increased India's value. 

 

•    In 1961, the Kennedy administration made a clear effort to improve ties by appointing John K. Galbraith, a man who loved India and famously got along with Nehru, as ambassador. The 1962 Chinese attack on India, on the other hand, completely changed the situation. 

 

•    Nehru, stunned beyond belief, sought assistance from Kennedy. Because of Galbraith's presence as a mediator, he was fortunate in that the awkward situation was partially alleviated for him. But that's a story that belongs in the larger story of China's betrayal of a great friend and well-wisher.

 

•    India's relations with the Soviet Union began on a chilly note but quickly warmed up. The Soviet cool stemmed from their belief that India was still under imperialist control. Nehru's government received Communist ambivalence toward the Indian freedom struggle and the leaders of the Congress party.

 

•    However, by 1951-52, signs of thawing began to appear, possibly as a result of India's handling of the Korean War crisis and her apparent independence from imperialist influence. At a time when the US was dragging its feet, the Soviets, along with China, sent food shipments to help alleviate the drought. Stalin met with the new ambassador, S. Radhakrishnan, the future Indian President, several times and even offered a friendship treaty. 

 

•    At the United Nations, signs of support for Kashmir began to emerge, and the CPI was told to tone down its criticism of Nehru's government. After Stalin's death in 1954, the process was accelerated. 

 

•    In 1954, after Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO, the Soviet Union offered India military equipment, but India declined due to its policy of not accepting free military aid. In 1955, Nehru made a highly successful visit to the Soviet Union, which was followed by equally successful visits by Khrushchev and Bulganin the following year.

 

•    In 1956, the Commenter’s 20th Congress, the Soviet-controlled body that established the ideological line for all Communist parties, put its stamp on the de-Stalinization process that had begun after Stalin's death, and attempted to soften the Cold War stance by talking about peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. It also introduced Marxism's brand-new concept of a peaceful path to Socialism. 

 

•    Another issue is that the US was so preoccupied with its own rhetoric that it failed to respond adequately to these possibilities. This was extremely beneficial to Indo-USSR relations because all ideological barriers to cooperation were removed. Since 1955, the USSR has given its full support to India's position on Kashmir, and since 1956, it has used or threatened to use its veto in the UN Security Council to block resolutions that are unfavorable to India. 

 

•    The significance of this cannot be overstated, as India had been in a precarious position in the Security Council until the USSR began to protect her. The unwavering support for Kashmir went a long way toward cementing Indo-Soviet friendship. Both countries also united in their opposition to colonialism. In opposition to the United States, the USSR supported India's integration of Goa at the United Nations.

 

•    India's economic development path, which was based on planning and a leading role for the public sector in industrialization, particularly in heavy industry, brought the country closer to the Soviet Union. While the western powers, particularly the United States, were hesitant to help, the Soviets eagerly offered assistance in the construction of the Bhilai steel plant in 1956. The British arrived in Durgapur, followed by the Germans in Rourkela. 

 

•    The US was approached again for the Bokaro plant, but when it remained evasive, the Soviets intervened. They also played an important role in oil exploration in later years. In 1973-74, it was estimated that "30% of India's steel, 35% of our oil, 20% of our electrical power, 65% of heavy electrical equipment, and 85% of our heavy machine-making machines are produced in projects established with Soviet aid."

 

•    When relations between India and China deteriorated in 1959, with the Dalai Lama seeking refuge in India and military clashes on the Sino-Indian border, the USSR did not automatically side with its Communist brother, but instead remained neutral, which was a major accomplishment at the time. 

 

•    Nehru recognized the significance of the Soviet stance and moved closer to the Soviet Union. The Chinese also trace their disagreements with the Soviet Union back to the same episode. In the same year, India and the Soviet Union signed their first military supply agreement, and in 1960, India received "supply dropping aircraft, helicopters, and engineering equipment for the Border Roads Development Board, which was to construct roads in China's disputed areas." 

 

•    In mid-1962, India and the Soviet Union reached an agreement allowing India to manufacture MiG aircraft, marking the first time the Soviets allowed a non-Communist country to manufacture sophisticated military equipment that even the Chinese were not allowed to do. The USSR remained neutral after the Chinese attack on India in October 1962, owing in part to the fact that it occurred during the height of the Cuban missile crisis. Later, in December 1962, at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Suslov, a key Soviet leader, unambiguously declared that China was to blame for the war.

 

•    In 1963, the Soviets signed more arms sales agreements and supplied interceptors and helicopters, tanks, mobile radar sets, surface-to-air missiles, submarines, missile boats, and patrol ships, unlike the western powers who failed to deliver on promises of military supplies in the aftermath of the Indo-China war. They assisted India in the development of MiG aeroplane manufacturing facilities as well as the construction of a naval dockyard. This self-sufficient manufacturing base was instrumental in India's victory in the 1971 war. Importantly, unlike the United States, they did not station personnel to supervise equipment use or impose difficult conditions for equipment deployment. This link benefited the Soviet Union as well. India was a key entry point into the Afro-Asian world of newly independent countries that did not want to be US satellites and were willing to befriend the Soviet Union. This also aided the USSR during the Cold War. 

 

•    Like India, the Soviet Union had a long border with China and numerous unresolved border disputes. The Soviets benefited from their friendship with India because it kept China in check. The non-alignment of the Indians shifted the balance of power away from the West, which was also beneficial. 

 

•    The USSR, which was surrounded by US-inspired pacts and military bases, could use a few friends, so the relationship was one of equality. Besides, for all its flaws, Marxism is anti-racist, anti-imperialist, and pro-poor, which prevented the Soviets from adopting a patronizing attitude, which the Americans frequently did, much to the chagrin of the Indians. As a result, Indo-Soviet friendship has become one of the most important aspects of Indian foreign policy.