Rise Of Regional States And Foreign Invasions Of India

The area under the direct control of the Mughal Emperor shrank dramatically in the decade following Nizam-ul- Mulk's departure from the court and his establishment as a semi-independent ruler in the Deccan. Murshid Quli Khan had effectively been in charge of Bengal since 1703.

 

•    Attempts to remove him from Bengal had failed, and he was in charge of Bengal and Orissa from 1710. Later, Bihar was added to his remit. Shujaat Khan, his son-in-law, succeeded him in 1727.

 

•    In 1723, Saadat Khan was appointed governor of Awadh, and in 1726, he declared his de facto independence by refusing to be transferred to Malwa. In 1739, he was succeeded by his son-in-law, Safdar Jung. In 1713, Abdus Samad Khan was appointed governor of Punjab, and his son, Zakariya Khan, succeeded him.

 

•    The dismemberment of the Empire caused by the emergence of these states had no negative impact on the political and economic development of the areas because the governors who took charge were exceptional individuals capable of effectively governing their domains as a whole. 

 

•    They also preserved the Imperial crown's outward sanctity by paying formal allegiance to the Emperor and securing his formal approval to the succession through gifts and other means. The rise of the Ruhelas in Awadh's northwestern region, as well as the Jats in the Agra-Mathura region and the Sikhs in Punjab's Punjab, created difficulties and led to the formation of new independent states or sub-states.

 

•    The Marathas' growing power and sway posed the greatest threat to all of these states. In 1739, a foreign threat appeared in the form of Nadir Shah. Despite the defeat of Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1748, the Punjab and areas up to Agra and beyond were soon subjected to recurrent foreign invasions, while the English established themselves in Bengal.

 

•    The Mughal court remained supine and prone to factionalism during this time. With the departure of Nizam-ul-Mulk from the Court, Muhammad Shah was freed from the thraldom of the wazir, but he showed little capacity for governance and administration, even though the outer routine of court life established by Akbar and the established forms of government were continued. 

 

•    During Muhammad Shah's twenty-nine years in power, he never led a military campaign, and his outings were limited to visiting local gardens and occasionally attending Garh Mukteshwar's annual festivals. He was, however, a religious liberal who freely participated in festivals such as Holi, Dashera, and others.

 

•    Unfortunately, he chose carpet knights who were good at witty conversation and soft in their behaviour as his main advisors, rather than men who were energetic and capable commanders. 

 

•    As wazir Qamaruddin Khan, a slothful and drunkard, and Mir Bakhshi Khan-i-Dauran, a Hindustani who had never led a campaign, he was chosen. “... Emperor and wazir alike lived in total forgetfulness of the business of the administration, the collection of the revenue, and the needs of the army,” writes a contemporary, Warid. 

 

•    “With a foolish, idle, and fickle master on the throne, the nobles began to give free play to the worst forms of selfishness,” writes noted historian Jadunath Sarkar. Bribery became commonplace, and jagirs were readily available. Kukijiu, the daughter of a geomancer who had predicted Muhammad Shah's ascension to the throne, and a holy man, Abdul Ghafur, who claimed magical powers, played pivotal roles in this.

 

•    Roshanuddaulah Zafar Khan Panipati, the third bakhshi, joined them. This group enriched itself through gifts given at the time of appointment or grant of jagirs, and the Emperor received a portion of the proceeds. Although this gang was deposed in 1732-33, the administration did not improve, with the smaller mansabdars bearing the brunt of the consequences. Due to the growing lawlessness, they found it nearly impossible to collect their dues from their jagirs. Because of the growing distance between the Emperor and the nobles, as well as a lack of funds to pay the army, the Empire was reduced to a hollow trunk.

 

•    In this situation, a new threat in the form of Nadir Shah arose in the north-west. Since the second half of the seventeenth century, the Safavid Empire has been in decline.

 

•    Mir Waiz, the Ghilzai Chief, rose up against the Persians in 1709 and seized the fort of Qandahar. His son deposed the Safavid king and had himself crowned in 1722. The Afghans now ruled Iran, while the Ottoman Turks and Russia seized the opportunity to conquer the country's western and northern regions.

 

•    Nadir Quli Beg, later known as Nadir Shah, rose to power in Persia by leading a national resistance war against the Afghans. By 1730, Nadir had driven the Ghilzais out of Persia's heartland and taken Herat from the Abdalis.

 

•    After that, he turned on the Ottomans. He drove them out of the western part of Iran in a series of campaigns, but failed to retake Baghdad. The two sides were forced to agree to a truce in 1736 due to exhaustion. 

 

•    Nadir had no trouble ousting the Safavid ruler, who was a minor, and ascending the throne in 1737, thanks to his reputation as an intrepid commander and a band of loyal followers.

 

•    The Delhi High Court sat back and watched the events unfold with benign indifference. After the expulsion of the Ghilzais and Abdalis from Persia and the stalemate in the war with the Ottomon Turks, Nadir Shah decided to invade India. 

 

•    Only from India could he replenish his treasury in order to continue the war against the Ottomans. After defeats at the hands of the Marathas in Malwa and Gujarat, as well as the appearance of a Maratha army outside Delhi in 1737, the Delhi government's weakness was no secret.

 

•    The Mughals attempted to protect India from a north-western invasion by using diplomatic means to ensure that a coalition of powers hostile to India did not emerge in West Asia, by maintaining a strong administration in Kabul, and, if possible, by maintaining control of Qandahar. 

 

•    Kabul and Qandahar were regarded as the two main entry points into India. The Mughals also attempted to control the Afghan tribesmen by providing them with economic benefits and employing them in their armies. When Nizam-ul-Mulk was in Delhi in 1724, he hinted at leading a campaign to Isfahan to restore the Safavids, with whom the Mughals had a long history of friendship despite their conflict over Qandahar control. 

 

•    The Court, on the other hand, lacked both the power and the desire to do so. Instead, it attempted to establish friendly relations with Ghilzai chief Mahmud through a letter exchange. Nadir Shah had sent Muhammad Shah an embassy in 1730, announcing his intention to march on Qandahar. He asked the Emperor to close the border to all Afghan refugees once the operations began, citing old friendship ties between the two countries and their shared interest in dealing with the Afghans. 

 

•    Muhammad Shah responded that the Kabul and Sindh subahdars had been ordered to comply, and that the Kabul army would be reinforced for the purpose. Instead of attacking Qandahar, Nadir Shah focused on the conflict with Turkey, and the Mughal court became preoccupied with the threat posed by the Marathas in Malwa and Gujarat, neglecting the northwestern provinces.

 

•    Since Aurangzeb's reign, a sum of rupees twelve lakhs has been sent to the Governor of Kabul for distribution among Afghan tribesmen and the defence of hill forts. Nasir Khan, the governor of Kabul, was a capable man, but Roshanuddaulah Zafar Khan, the third bakhshi in charge of payment, kept half of the subvention. When Zafar Khan was deposed in 1732-33, he was ordered to repay the government two crores of rupees that he had misappropriated. Khan-i-Dauran, the Mir Bakhshi, was entrusted with the responsibility of paying the subsidy. Khan-i-Dauran was not a corrupt man, but he had reservations about Nasir Khan, an Irani who had been appointed by Zafar Khan. 

 

•    Despite the fact that the threat of an Iranian invasion of Kabul and India was widely discussed and even the subject of bazar gossip, Khan-i-Dauran dismissed the threat and even accused Nasir Khan of working with Nadir Shah. 

 

•    As a result, the subsidy was either paid irregularly or only partially. Nasir Khan wrote in desperation that at least one year's salary should be paid to him out of the five years' salary due to the soldiers so that he could pay his creditors and have some money left over. “Our houses are built on the plains, and we do not fear anything what we see with our eyes,” Khan-i-Dauran said, describing it as an excuse to extract large sums of money. Your house is located on the Bhochla hill, and you have most likely seen Mongol and Qizalbash armies from your roof.”

 

•    Nadir Shah appears to have been using the flight of Afghans to Afghanistan as a pretext for interfering in the country. In 1732, he dispatched a second embassy with the same complaint. The Delhi court excused itself, claiming that it was preoccupied with "Deccan infidels," and reaffirmed the earlier assurances.

 

•    Nadir Shah sent a third envoy in 1737, announcing his coronation and his plans to conquer Qandahar. He reiterated his earlier demands for the Afghans to be barred from entering Kabul and Peshwar. The envoy was given forty days to return. Despite receiving a response from the Court circles, the envoy stayed in Delhi for a year because he enjoyed the comforts of life there and was smitten by a courtesan. Again, Nadir Shah's demands were nothing more than a pretext for invading India.

 

•    Nadir Shah marched on Kabul after the fall of Qandahar in early 1738. The Mughal Court had made no attempt to strengthen the governor's position. Nadir Shah wrote to Muhammad Shah after the capture of Kabul, denying any intention of attacking Indian Territory. 

 

•    Nasir Khan, the Governor of Kabul, had heavily fortified the Khyber Pass to prevent Nadir Shah from entering Punjab. Nadir besieged Lahore after outflanking and defeating him. Zakariya Khan, the governor of Lahore, sent urgent appeals to Delhi for reinforcements, but none arrived, and Zakariya Khan was forced to lay down arms after a valiant resistance. 

 

•    The road to Delhi had now become clear. We don't need to go over the Court's complete incompetence in dealing with the impending invasion. It couldn't decide who should lead the army: a blood prince, Nizam-ul-Mulk, who had arrived in Delhi a few days earlier, the wazir, the Mir Bakhshi, or the Emperor himself. 

 

•    It was widely assumed that Nizam-ul-Mulk and Saadat Khan, the governor of Awadh, invited Nadir Shah to India to combat the growing Maratha threat. We have no documentary evidence to back up this claim. Nadir Shah, on the other hand, did not require such an invitation.

 

•    The defeat of the Mughals at Karnal, the death of Mir Bakhshi, Khan-i-Dauran, while fighting to aid Saadat Khan, the capture of both Nizam-ul-Mulk and Saadat Khan, the surrender of the Mughal Emperor, and the execution and atrocities perpetrated by Nadir Shah at Delhi, which are still etched in public memory, do not need to deter us. 

 

•    The consequences of Nadir Shah's invasion, on the other hand, must be assessed. The invasion of Nadir Shah, as well as the loss of Kabul and areas west of the Indus, opened India up to recurrent foreign invasions from the north-west. Nadir Shah also annexed the province of Thatta, as well as the forts and fortresses that belonged to it. The defeat of the Mughal Emperor increased public awareness of the Mughals' waning power. This was a call to action for all types of local rajas and zamindars, as well as others.

 

•    However, the impact of Nadir Shah's wealth and treasures - estimated to be worth seventy crores of rupees and including the peacock throne and the legendary kohinoor - has been greatly exaggerated. The Indian economy remained strong and vibrant, and the shortfall was quickly made up. Delhi was a thriving city and the centre of trade, industry, and finance until 1772.

 

•    With the deaths of Khan-i-Dauran and Saadat Khan, as well as Nizam-ul-departure Mulk's for the Deccan, the old factions at the court vanished as a result of Nadir Shah's invasion. Qamaruddin Khan, the wazir, was also discredited. This was a fantastic opportunity for Muhammad Shah to appoint a group of new, capable advisors to help him consolidate what has come to be known as "the state of Delhi," or the area roughly extending from Saharanpur to Nagor in the west, Farrukhabad in the east, and the Ganges line to the south of the Chambal. 

 

•    As it was, old factions gave way to new factions, and administration was completely neglected, to the point where, in the words of a contemporary, Ashub, "every zamindar became a Raja, and every Raja a Maharaja." Even in this depleted state, the Mughal armies were able to meet and defeat the Afghan invader, Ahmad Shah Abdali, who had taken over as Afghan king after Nadir Shah's assassination in 1747. Ahmad Shah invaded India, intending to plunder it in order to pay his Afghan followers.

 

•    Only after the fall of Lahore did the Delhi Court realise the danger. The Mughals won the battle of Manupur (1748) thanks to the valiant efforts of Muin-ul-Mulk, Qamaruddin Khan's son, and Safdar Jung, Saadat Khan's son-in-law and successor. This demonstrates that the nobles and soldiers had character and a desire to fight. What was lacking was organisation and leadership, which meant that the right men were not being chosen for the right jobs.

 

•    In addition to the threat from the north, the court and the emerging independent states had to contend with another threat: the Maratha attempt to establish Maratha dominance in the name of the Peshwa.