The Third Battle Of Panipat

When Raghunath Rao returned to North India in early 1757, he made no attempt to form a coalition of Northern powers to fight the Abdali. This could only have happened if the Peshwa had been willing to drastically alter, or at the very least postpone, his ambitions in the north until the Abdali threat was dealt with. In fact, the Peshwa had grandiose plans even at this time, as evidenced by his letter to Ramaji Anant, the Sindhias' manager, dated February 23, 1759. 

 

•    The Peshwa devised a strategy for conquering Bengal and Bihar in order to recoup a crore or a crore and a half of his debt. The Nawab of Awadh, Shuja-ud-Daula, was to be persuaded to join by promising him the position of Imperial Wazir. He was to give up Banaras and Allahabad in exchange for 50 lakhs. Najib-ul-Daulah was to be killed because he was untrustworthy. There is no mention of using Shuja's assistance against the Afghans.

 

•    The establishment of the Maratha, specifically the Peshwa's supremacy in North India, was clearly at stake, not just the battle against the foreigner, Ahmad Shah Abdali. That is why Suraj Mal Jat and Shuja were apprehensive about joining the Marathas. Both offered to negotiate with the Abdali to persuade him to leave India if the Marathas promised to leave the Deccan. 

 

•    Raghunath Rao went about asserting and establishing Maratha "supremacy" in North India, blissfully ignoring the sentiments of both the Nawab of Awadh and the Jat raja, Suraj Mal. After the departure of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Marathas arrived in Delhi early in 1757 and made little effort to win over the Awadh Nawab, Shuja, by removing Imad-ul-Mulk and destroying the Ruhela chief, Najib-ul-Daula. 

 

•    They did assist Shuja in repelling the Abdali's armies, which were equipped and prepared by the Abdali and backed by Imad-ul-Mulk, from invading Awadh and Allahabad. They also successfully resisted Imad's attempt to deprive Shuja of the Allahabad province. They didn't want to ally with Shuja because they didn't want to annoy Imad-ul-Mulk.

 

•    Raghunath Rao moved to Punjab without befriending Shuja or dealing with the Ruhelas. A new Mughal official was appointed as Governor Lahore at the request of Imad-ul-Mulk, after the previous governor Muin-ul-Mulk died. In the absence of the Abdali, it was simple to do so and oust the Abdali officials. 

 

•    Despite the Marathas marching up to Attock, it was clear that the Indus line could not be held against Abdali without a strong, well-knit Punjab army led by a reputed leader. Such an army would require adequate support from Doab and Delhi. 

 

•    Raghunath Rao's Punjab adventure was doomed to fail because none of these conditions existed. The need to protect the Maratha rear by taking action against Najib-ul-Daula, the Ruhela chief, was only realised after the advance into Punjab.

 

•    However, with the Awadh Nawab, who had a hereditary enmity with the Ruhelas, little effort was made to do so. As a result, Dattaji Sindhia, the Maratha chief, received no support from the Nawab. Shuja actually moved to support Najib in his siege of Shukratal, believing that if the Ruhelas were defeated, Awadh's turn would be next.

 

•    Sadashiv Bhau's hope of winning over, or at the very least neutralising, the Awadh Nawab in the upcoming battle with the Abdali was extremely difficult to realise in this situation.

 

•    The Maratha agent Govind Ballal's inability to gather boats near Etawah due to unseasonably heavy rains, preventing the Bhau from entering the doab, and exert pressure on the Awadh Nawab Shuja to join him or remain neutral, has received a lot of attention. 

 

•    Shuja, the Marathas, and the Abdali, with the support of Najib-ul-Daula, had been negotiating for a long time. The Marathas had emphasised the foreign invader's alliance with their hereditary enemies, the Ruhelas, as well as the Marathas' hereditary friendship with Safdur Jung. 

 

•    They were also willing to give in to Shuja's demand for the wizarat and install Ali Gauhar, Imad's arch-enemy, as king of Delhi. The Abdali also offered Shuja the wizarat and made Ali Gauhar the king of Delhi through Najib-ul-Daulah. He shrewdly argued, however, that the Maratha policy of enslaving the entire Hindustan required no explanation, even to a layman. Also used was the communal argument.

 

•    Shuja's decision to join the Abdali was unquestionably tactical and psychologically beneficial to him. Because of their errors of judgement over the next half-dozen years, the Marathas were unable to exploit the long-standing differences between Shuja and Najib-ud Daulah.

 

•    Even if Shuja had remained neutral, the Bhau would not have been able to defeat the Abdali, who was armed to the teeth and surrounded by women. In this situation, Bhau's best course would have been to accept Holkar's advice not to cross the Chambal but to base himself in the area around Gwaliyar-Dholpur, or Suraj Mal's advice to leave the heavy artillery and women and children in the Jat ruler's territories and engage the Abdali in a war of movement in which the Marathas had always excelled. 

 

•    This would not have hampered the Peshwa's second wish, which was to collect funds from north India to pay off his one-crore debt. Bhau, on the other hand, not only advanced to Delhi in July 1760 and reinstated Imad-ul-Mulk as wazir, causing Suraj Mal to abandon his side, but he also entrenched himself at Panipat in November 1760, exposing his flank in the doab to the Abdali.

 

•    The defeat of the Marathas at Panipat (14 January 1761) revealed the Maratha mode of warfare's flaws, as well as their inability to deal with new developments. The mobile Maratha mode of warfare was gradually giving way to the more cumbersome Mughal mode of warfare, in which the administration and royal ladies accompanied the camp. 

 

•    The Mughal camp, on the other hand, was guarded by a highly mobile artillery known as stirrup artillery. Peshwa Balaji Rao had been impressed by Bussy's artillery and disciplined soldiers, and had dispatched a detachment of them under Ibrahim "Gardi." While the artillery under the Peshwas improved, we don't know how much mobile artillery loaded on camels and other animals was used. 

 

•    The Maratha soldiers appeared to still rely on the lance and sword, whereas the Afghans had switched to quick-firing flint-lock muskets. At Panipat, Ibrahim Gardi's artillery was largely immobile, and it became useless unless it was protected by gun-firing cavalry.

 

•    Ahmad Shah Abdali's artillery, on the other hand, was mounted on camels and could be moved to any location when the need arose. The lack of coordination among the Maratha warriors was also a source of weakness.

 

•    The Peshwa's attempt to establish supremacy in North India came to an end with the Maratha defeat at Panipat. Its failure allowed the Gaikwar, Bhonsle, Holkar, Sindhia, and other Maratha sardars to carve out their own regional states. The size and power of some of these regional states grew. Mahadji Sindhia, a Maratha leader, escorted (Ali Gauhar) Emperor Shah Alam II back to Delhi in 1772, not the Peshwa.

 

•    As a result, the battle of Panipat can be viewed as a conflict between centralism and regionalism. While the Peshwa's bid for supremacy and centralism failed at Panipat in 1761, the ultimate beneficiaries were the English, not the Maratha sardars and erstwhile Mughal nobles who stood for regionalism.