The Maratha Advance Into The Doab And Punjab

Between 1741 and 1761, there were two distinct periods. From 1741 to 1752, the first phase took place. It began with the death of Baji Rao and the final Mughal cession of Malwa and Gujarat, while the entry of the Marathas into the doab and Ahmad Shah Abdali into the Punjab in 1752 marked a new turn in Northern Indian politics. Between 1752 and 1761, the preparations for the showdown between the Marathas and the Abdali for control of North India were in full swing.

 

•    The Marathas focused their efforts in the first phase (1741-1752) on establishing their claim to the chauth of so-called "frontier" areas. Raghuji Bhonsle raided Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa for chauth in 1741-42. 

 

•    From 1743 onwards, when Shahu "allotted" Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa to Raghuji, these raids became an annual occurrence. Despite strong opposition from Nawab Alivardi Khan, an agreement was reached with him in 1751, under which the chauth of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa was fixed at Rs.12,000 annually, and areas of south Orissa were given to Raghuji in exchange. 

 

•    Raghuji Bhonsle was also given the authority to appoint the province's governor. As a result, Orissa was effectively taken over by the Marathas.

 

•    The Marathas fought Nizam (Asaf Jah) and his successor, Nasir Jang, for control of Karnataka and Khandesh in the Deccan. Raghuji Bhonsle raided Karnataka, but the Nizam was able to establish his dominance in the state for the time being due to Raghuji's involvement with Bengal and Orissa.

 

•    The battle between the Peshwa and Bussy, the Frenchman who had ruled Haiderabad since Asaf Jah's death in 1748, resulted in a war in which neither side won, but Bussy was forced to hand over the remaining revenues of Khandesh, the western half of Berar, and the small province of Baglana. The Treaty of Bhalke was the reason for this (1751).

 

•    Rajasthan was a third area where the Marathas prospered. The Peshwa's lieutenants, Holkar and Sindhia, were successful in forcing most of the Rajput states to agree to pay chauth and sometimes campaigning expenses (khandani) to the Marathas by interfering in internal affairs, including succession disputes. It should be noted that the Mughal Emperors used to settle succession disputes among the Rajputs. The Marathas' arrival in this region was also a sign of the Mughal Emperor's waning power and prestige.

 

•    The Maratha entry into Rajasthan can only be explained tactically as a first step in preparing the ground for control of Agra, Delhi, and the Punjab region. In that case, rather than taxing the Rajput rajas in the name of chauth, the Rajput rajas needed to be made friends. 

 

•    Rajasthan was essentially a deficit state, and many of the rulers relied heavily on the income of the jagirs from outside the state. Mughal nobles employed a large number of Rajput sardars and soldiers. The Rajputs' growing frustration and resentment of the Marathas led to the assassination of about 5000 Marathas in Jaipur in 1751 by citizens and followers of Madho Singh.

 

•    “The shock of this blow spread outside the capital,” Jadunath Sarkar says. The Rajputs rose up in the villages and slaughtered the Marathas' couriers wherever they could find them.” This was not the first time such a "explosion of Rajput hatred" occurred. Vijai Singh, Abai Singh of Marwar's grandson and successor, had previously murdered Jayappa Sindhia. These examples demonstrate the negative consequences of the Peshwa's and his lieutenants' narrow and egotistical Maratha attitude toward Rajasthan, for which the Peshwa and his lieutenants, Sindhias and Holkar, must be held accountable.

 

•    Balaji Rao, also known as Nana Sahib Peshwa, was a humane and cultured man who built beautiful buildings in Poona and did much to make it a cultural centre. He also attracted a large number of brahman bankers to the city. He paid special attention to establishing an administration in the Peshwa-controlled territories. 

 

•    Every district was assigned a Kamvisdar, who began sending detailed reports on the state of agriculture. 

 

•    These reports, which were based on the Mughal model and included information such as the names of the farmers, the amount of land and crops cultivated, ploughs, oxen, and wells in the village, etc., allowed for more realistic land taxation and encouraged a resettling policy. 

 

•    Ruined villages, and the expansion of agriculture The land revenue was collected and assessed by both zamindars and village headmen.

 

•    The impact of these sound policies on the state and economy is still up for debate. Baji Rao left behind a debt that ranged from seventeen lakhs to a crore rupees. G.S. Sardesai, a modern historian, estimates it at fifty lakhs.

 

•    This sum was made up of loans obtained from Poona bankers, who dunned the Peshwa for repayment and made his life a living hell. This was why, during the Battle of Bhopal, Baji Rao demanded 50 lakhs from Nizam-ul-Mulk. Despite Nizam's agreement to pay this sum, neither Nizam nor the Mughal Emperor ever did. 

 

•    Despite his financial abilities, Balaji had to deal with a country that had yet to recover from the effects of a long war and a breakdown in government, and was relatively less productive and developed. He had to fund his bloated army's campaigning as well. 

 

•    As a result, the Maratha army resembled a mercenary force that could be hired or was always on the lookout for plunder. This made pursuing a consistent political policy that would have benefited larger Maratha interests difficult.

 

•    It appears that the Maratha polity required a period of consolidation before embarking on a war of expansion across vast swaths of land. Balaji Baji Rao devoted his energies to settling the administration and consolidating Maratha conquests in the Deccan, almost following the Pratinidhi's programme during the time of Baji Rao. 

 

•    From 1753, the Peshwas led annual expeditions into Karnataka to liberate it from the Haiderabad state's control. The Peshwa took advantage of the departure of Bussy, the French advisor, and attached the Haiderabad state, forcing it to surrender the four northern cities of Ahmadnagar, Daultabad, Burhanpur, and Bijapur, as well as sixty lakh rupees in territory, at Udgir (1761).

 

•    Balaji, on the other hand, combined a consolidation strategy with an aggressive, forward-thinking strategy in North India. “The new Peshwa (Balaji Baji Rao) was no soldier either by inclination or profession, and managed to execute military operations through loyal and trusted subordinates of his own,” writes G.S. Sardesai. 

 

•    The policy's limitations are self-evident. It was made worse by the fact that the new Peshwa knew little about North Indian politics. In 1747-48, he made his fourth and final trip to the north, to Rajasthan. He never returned to the north after that until his death. 

 

•    Balaji Baji Rao may not have been able to abandon an aggressive, forward policy in the North, even for a short time, because the Peshwa's strength came from capable and ambitious leaders like Ranoji Sindhi and Malhar Rao Holkar. These ambitious leaders could not be kept idle, lest the Peshwa's position be jeopardised. In other words, the Peshwa had mounted a tiger with the conquest of Gujarat and Malwa, from which it was difficult to dismount.

 

•    A new political situation had arisen in North India with the rise of Ahmad Shah Abdali and his invasion of India in 1748, which was followed by many others in regular succession. The Emperor had requested assistance from the Peshwa after learning of the Abdali's capture of Lahore. 

 

•    The Peshwa was willing to help the Emperor and had dispatched Sindhia and Holkar from Poona. Balaji's actions corresponded to Baji Rao's call for a united front of Marathas and Mughal nobles against the external foe during Nadir Shah's invasion. 

 

•    The Abdali, on the other hand, had been defeated before the Marathas arrived in North India. Balaji returned to Delhi soon after, after visiting Jaipur, and had a cordial meeting with Emperor Muhammad Shah. The question was whether the Marathas were willing to abandon or change their stated intention of subverting the Mughal Empire in order to deal with the new situation.

 

•    The question may not have been posed in this way by the Marathas, but it became more prominent with each new Abdali invasion.

 

•    The settlement reached by Shahu in 1743 between Raghuji Bhonsle and the Peshwa, in which Raghuji was given the right of chauth and sardeshmukhi in Bengal, Bihar (except 12 lakhs), Orissa, and Awadh, and the Peshwa was given the “campaigning” right and chauth and sardeshmukhi of Malwa, Ajmer, Despite the fact that the Peshwa did not stake claims for many of these areas for almost a decade, and it took another half-decade for him to stake a claim on Punjab, Shahu's "award" was never forgotten and coloured the Peshwa's political thinking. 

 

•    However, lacking Baji Rao's military abilities, the new Peshwa was forced to rely on new, untested men. This, along with constant bickering among the Maratha sardars, contributed to the erratic and fumbling Maratha policy during this period. 

 

•    After Emperor Muhammad Shah's death in 1748, the new emperor Ahmad Shah named Safdar Jung, the governor of Awadh and Allahabad, as wazir. The Ruhela Afghans of Shahjahanabad and Bareilly, who had usurped many new areas in the districts of Badaun, Pilibhit, and others, and the Bangash Afghans of Farrukhabad, who had likewise extended their control to Kora-Jahanabad on one side and up to Aligarh on the other, saw it as a golden opportunity to deal with two of his biggest internal enemies.

 

•    Safdar Jung, unable to deal with the Ruhelas, turned on the Bangash Afghans in the ensuing complex struggle. However, he fell to Ahmad Khan Bangash in a resounding defeat. Safdar Jung had now turned to the Marathas for assistance. 

 

•    The Marathas, led by Sindhia and Holkar, reacted quickly, seeing it as an opportunity to curry favour with the Imperial wazir while also establishing themselves in the doab. The wazir promised them Rs.25,000 per day for campaigning expenses. Suraj Mal, a Jat Raja, was also used for the purpose.

 

•    Ahmad Bangash was defeated by the Marathas by a large margin. However, the wazir received an urgent summons from the Emperor due to a renewed invasion by Ahmad Shah Abdali before they could crush him. As a result, the Ruhela and Bangash Afghans signed a treaty. 

 

•    The payment of the campaigning expenses due to the Marathas was transferred to the Afghan chief, Ahmad Bangash, by Safdar Jung. The Marathas appear to have acquired the parganas of Phapund, Shikohabad, and Etawa, as well as Kora and Jahanabad, in the name of the Peshwa, in order to satisfy their claims. Maratha agents were in charge of these. As a result, the Marathas gained access to the doab.

 

•    Safdar Jung appears to have developed a positive impression of the Marathas and concluded that the Abdali threat could only be defeated with their assistance. He was also aware of the Abdali's close ties to his internal enemies, the Ruhela and Bangash Afghans. This could explain why he listened sympathetically to the Marathas' far-reaching demands and promises at the time.

 

•    According to a document dated April 12, 1752, it was agreed that the Marathas would protect the Emperor from internal enemies such as Pathans, Rajputs, and other rebels, as well as external foes such as Afghan King Abdali; that the Emperor would pay the Marathas 50 lakhs in exchange for their assistance; and that the Peshwas would be given the subahdaris of Agra and Ajmer.

 

•    The Peshwa was also given the authority to collect chauth from Punjab, Sindh, and the Doab, according to the document. These could have been the Maratha demands and suggestions. Safdar Jung was unlikely to agree to pay chauth in the doab from his lands. 

 

•    In any case, the Emperor ignored these demands because he had already agreed to the Abdali demand for the subahdari of Lahore and Sindh before Safdar Jung and his Maratha allies arrived in Delhi.

 

•    These proposals demonstrate the Maratha ambitions' scope, as well as their inherent contradictions. The Marathas couldn't defeat the Abdali and fulfil these far-reaching demands unless they met and overcame the resistance of the Nawab of Awadh, the Jats, the Afghans, and the Rajputs - the very people they needed to fight the Abdali.

 

•    The Peshwa and his advisers appear to have made no attempt to resolve these obvious contradictions. In 1753, the wazir, Safdar Jung, had a falling out with the Emperor Ahmad Shah, resulting in a civil war. Ghazi-ud-Din Imad-ul-Mulk (then 16 years old), son of the former wazir, Qamaruddin Khan, led the opposition to the wazir. 

 

•    Najib Khan Ruhela, a fierce opponent of the wazir and ally of the Abdali, joined him. Both sides attempted to gain Maratha support. If the Peshwa helped him become wazir, Imad-ul-Mulk offered to pay one crore rupees and allot the subahs of Awadh and Allahabad to him. Sindhia and Holkar were dispatched by the Peshwa to assist Imad. Safdar Jung, however, had been defeated before they could arrive.

 

•    He was allowed to keep his governorships of Awadh and Allahabad and return to his duties. A year later, he died. Imad-ul-Mulk was given the title of wazir, and Najib Mir Bakhshi was given the title of Najib Mir Bakhshi.

 

•    We don't know what factors influenced Balaji Baji Rao to sideline an old friend like Safdar Jung in favour of an immature youth backed by the Ruhela chief, who could never be a friend or trusted. Perhaps the Peshwa believed that a weak wazir would be more convenient for the Maratha ambitions for the doab's chauth. 

 

•    It left the Awadh Nawabs with a deep sense of suspicion toward the Marathas, which the Marathas had to pay for later. Surprisingly, Suraj Mal, a Jat Raja who had joined the Marathas in Safdar Jung's war against the Afghans, refused to abandon his former friend.

 

•    The alliance with the wazir Imad-ul-Mulk from 1753 to 1759 was a period when Maratha power in North India reached its pinnacle, but it was also a period when the Marathas alienated all of their potential allies and paved the way for the disaster at Panipat in 1761. 

 

•    The Mughal Emperor's prestige plummeted during this time, with successive rulers, Ahmad Shah in 1754 and Alamgir II in 1759, assassinated by the wazir Imad-ul-Mulk. The Marathas, too, had to bear the shame of being parties to such heinous deeds as a result of their alliance with Imad.

 

•    During this time, the Peshwa sent three major campaigns to North India, the first two of which were led by his younger brother, Raghunath Rao, an 18-year-old who had never visited the region before, and the third by his nephew, Sadashiv Bhau, a renowned general and administrator who was the victor of Udgir.

 

•    Raghunath Rao has often been blamed for exacerbating the Marathas' political and financial problems in North India, and for creating a situation that the Bhau was unable to resolve later. Raghunath Rao and the Bhau, on the other hand, were faced with the same set of problems for which there was no solution: they were asked to collect money to pay off the Peshwa's massive debt while also looking for allies to fight the Abdali. 

 

•    As a result, Raghunath Rao's first action during his first expedition was to demand one crore rupees from the Jat raja, as well as the restoration of the lands he had encroached upon, thanks to Imad-ul-clever Mulk's grant of the subahdari of Agra and Ajmer to the Peshwa. 

 

•    In the absence of Maratha siege guns, the four-month Maratha investment in the powerful Kumbher fort could only result in a compromise. 

 

•    The Jat raja agreed to pay 50 lakhs in three annual instalments, but they were never paid and he was perpetually in arrears. The only other source of income was the doab, which meant going to war with Safdar Jung and the Afghans. 

 

•    Raghunath Rao made only feeble raids in the doab because this was not possible. He then marched into Rajasthan, which had already fallen under Holkar and Sindhia's control. After that, he returned without acquiring any new territory or money.

 

•    During Raghunath Rao's absence, Ahmad Shah ravaged Delhi and extended his marauding activities as far as Mathura, Gokul, and Vrindavan in 1756-1757. In the absence of the Marathas, Imad-ul-Mulk had no choice but to make peace with the Abdali, who had fled after appointing Najib-ud-Daula as Mir Bakhshi and virtual representative. The Jat raja, who stood behind his strong forts of Dig, Bharatpur, and others, was the Abdali's only opponent.