The Kargil War

Every year on July 26th, India commemorates Kargil Vijay Diwas, the anniversary of our victory over Pakistani infiltrators in the 1999 Kargil War. This day also serves as a day of remembrance for the hundreds of Indian soldiers who were killed in Pakistan's war.

 

•    The war occurred between May and July 1999 in Jammu and Kashmir's Kargil district, which was previously a part of Ladakh's Baltistan district before India's 1947 partition and was separated by the LOC after the first Kashmir War (1947-1948). 

 

•    The conflict began in the winter of early 1999, when the Pakistan Army retook the forward positions and strategic peaks of Kargil, Drass, and Batalik with the help of the Mujahideen. 

•    The infiltration by Pakistan was dubbed "Operation Al-Badar." The Indian Army was able to determine the points of incursion based on information from local shepherds and deployed four divisions to retake the strategic peaks in order to secure its main supply line in Kashmir. 

 

•    "Operation Vijay" was the name of India's operation to reclaim their territory. Pakistani soldiers had taken up positions at higher altitudes, giving them a tactical advantage in combat by allowing them to fire down on advancing Indian troops. 

 

•    During the operation, Pakistan shot down two Indian fighter jets, while another fighter jet crashed. It lasted between 40 and 60 days in a minus ten-degree environment. 

 

•    The Indian Army had taken strategic peaks like Tiger Hill and Tololing until July 4, 1999. Bofors FH- 77B artillery guns were used during the war. 

 

•    Although the US is said to have refused GPS assistance, Israel assisted India with ordnance and armaments, as well as providing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or drones) The Indian Air Force used MiG-27 and MiG-29 fighter jets to attack Pakistani troops, and the bomb was dropped wherever Pakistani troops were stationed. 

 

•    Several Pakistani targets were hit with R-77 missiles thanks to the MiG-29. During this war, MiG-21s and Mirage 2000s from the Indian Air Force were extensively used in Operation Safed Sagar. 

 

•    Captain Vikram Batra, an Indian Army officer, was posthumously awarded India's highest and most prestigious valour award, the Param Vir Chakra, for his actions during the 1999 Kargil War in Kashmir between India and Pakistan.

 

•    The international community has chastised Pakistan for allowing paramilitary forces and insurgents to cross the Line of Control (LOC). 

 

•    Pakistan also attempted to internationalize the Kashmir issue by tying the Kargil crisis to the larger Kashmir conflict, but such a diplomatic stance drew little support on the international stage. Pakistan was identified as the aggressor by the US and the West, including the G8 nations, who condemned it. 

 

•    The other G8 countries backed India and condemned Pakistan's violation of the Line of Control. The European Union was also against the breach of the Line of Control. 

 

•    China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, did not intervene in Pakistan's favor, instead insisting on a pullout of forces from the Line of Control and a peaceful resolution of border disputes. The ASEAN Regional Forum backed India's position on the LOC's inviolability. 

 

•    Pakistan requested that the United States intervene, but President Bill Clinton refused until Pakistani troops were removed from the Line of Control. Faced with mounting international pressure, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was able to pull the remaining troops out of Indian Territory. As Pakistani troops withdrew, Indian armed forces attacked the remaining outposts, retaking the last of them on July 26.

 

•    After the war, Clinton wrote in his autobiography that "Sharif's moves were perplexing," because the Indian prime minister had travelled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem, and "Pakistan had wrecked the bilateral talks by crossing the Line of Control." 

 

•    He praised India's restraint in not crossing the Line of Control and turning the conflict into a full-fledged war. During the Kargil crisis, one of the main concerns among the international community was that both neighbours had access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and that if the conflict escalated, it could have led to nuclear war. 

 

•    Both countries had conducted nuclear tests in 1998. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, while Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 1998. 

 

•    Pakistan's foreign secretary warned that escalation of the limited conflict could force Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. Many ambiguous statements by officials from both countries were interpreted as a nuclear crisis on the horizon. 

 

•    When the United States received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved closer to the border, the nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took on a more sinister tone. Bill Clinton attempted to persuade Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif not to go nuclear, even threatening Pakistan with dire consequences if he did so. Sharif ordered the Pakistani army to leave the Kargil heights, citing a deteriorating military situation, diplomatic isolation, and the threat of a larger conventional and nuclear war. 

 

•    The threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) also included the potential use of chemical and biological weapons. Pakistan accused India of employing chemical and incendiary weapons, such as napalm, against Kashmiri insurgents. 

 

•    India, on the other hand, displayed a cache of gas masks, as well as other firearms, as evidence that Pakistan was prepared to use unconventional weapons. However, no nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction were used, making the war a limited conflict.

 

•    The success of India in the Kargil war was due to a successful combination of diplomacy and force. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, India was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1172, and multilateral and bilateral sanctions put India on the back foot when 1999 rolled around. In this context, India made the decision not to cross the Line of Control (LoC). 

 

•    It required international support, which was seen as a potential "major force multiplier," similar to the support of the domestic audience. India's first television war was Kargil. This galvanised public opinion in India's favour. During the war, blood donations to the Indian Red Cross Society in New Delhi increased. 

 

•    Furthermore, donations to soldiers' welfare funds grew at an exponential rate. Wounded soldiers, coffins, and bereaved families were used to raise awareness and show solidarity. 

 

•    In addition, the use of the media was seen as a positive for the Indian military. By the end of June, the US government, the European Union, and the G-8 had all threatened Pakistan with sanctions unless it retreated to its side of the Line of Control. Pressure from around the world was increasing. 

 

•    Even Pakistan's long-time allies in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) chose to soften their anti-India resolutions. The Kargil conflict was the first time in the history of South Asian conflicts that the US backed India strongly. 

 

•    It laid the groundwork for the current US-India relationship, which culminated almost a decade later in the Indo-US nuclear deal. Furthermore, India was able to exert international pressure on Pakistan in subsequent conflicts, particularly in the aftermath of the 2001 Parliament attacks and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

 

Report of the Kargil Review Committee

A committee led by K. Subrahmanyam was formed to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir, and to recommend measures deemed necessary to protect national security against such armed intrusions.

 

•    The Committee recommended that a full-time National Security Adviser be appointed. Members of the National Security Council, as well as the senior bureaucracy, must be kept up to date on gathered intelligence on national, regional, and international issues. 

 

•    Kargil emphasised the country's woeful surveillance capabilities, particularly through satellite imagery. It highlighted India's fragmented communication capabilities as well as its lack of funding. 

 

•    The paramilitary forces' role and responsibilities must be restructured, particularly in terms of command, control, and leadership functions. They must be trained to much higher performance standards and equipped to deal with terrorist threats. 

 

•    It called for a thorough investigation in order to develop force structures and procedures that would improve border management and reduce, if not eliminate, narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists, and arms inflows. 

 

•    It suggested that India's defence spending be increased because budgetary constraints have hampered modernization and created operational voids. Infantrymen should be equipped with superior light weight weapons, equipment, and clothing that are suited to the threats they will face in alpine conditions. 

 

•    It was suggested that the entire spectrum of national security management and apex decision-making, as well as the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters, be thoroughly examined and reorganised. 

 

•    It advocated for the release of a White Paper on India's nuclear weapons program. 

 

•    It was recommended that the government review its information policy and develop structures and processes to keep the public informed on important national issues, such as the 1965 and 1971 wars, as well as the Kargil war. 

 

•    Improving the use of highly sophisticated industrial capacity and related manpower to facilitate defence exports. 

 

•    To smooth relationships during times of emergency and stress, such as war and proxy war, the establishment of a civil-military liaison mechanism at various levels, from the highest-ranking command headquarters to operational formations on the ground, is critical.

 

Given the current low point in India-Pakistan relations, as well as India's increased willingness to use force, it is critical for the Indian government to learn from Kargil and lay out specific political goals that can be achieved through diplomatic means. This should take the form of a formalised agenda that prioritizes diplomacy over impromptu displays of strength.

 

•    India secretly conducted a series of underground nuclear tests with five bombs in Pokhran, Rajasthan, on May 13, 1998, at 15:45 hours. Although this was not the first time the country tested its nuclear weapons (the first successful test was in 1974 under the codename "Smiling Buddha"), it was undoubtedly the most memorable due to the magnitude of the impact it had on the country's states and neighbours. 

 

•    The series of tests known as Pokhran-II (also known as Operation Shakti-98) included one fusion bomb and four fission bombs. Shortly after all five warheads were detonated on May 13, 1998, then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared India a full-fledged nuclear power. As a result of this statement, there were repercussions. Countries like the United States and Japan have imposed a slew of sanctions on India.

 

•    Thousands of miles away, US senator Richard Shelby stated in an interview that the CIA's failure to detect the tests was "the biggest failure of our intelligence gathering agencies in the last ten years or more."

 

•    After the nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, George Fernandes, APJ Abdul Kalam, R Chidambaram, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, and Pramod Mahajan met in Pokhran.

 

•    Although foreign countries viewed India's nuclear programme as a threat, DRDO chief APJ Abdul Kalam stated clearly in a press conference that the nuclear weapons were for "national security." In some ways, Kalam was correct. 

 

•    As he stated, India has never invaded foreign territory in the last 2,500 years, but foreign invaders have laid siege to various parts of the subcontinent. On national television, India's then-Prime Minister declared that his country would never be the first to develop nuclear weapons and that it would not use them against countries that had not developed their own.

 

•    In the midst of these events, most people overlook an important question: how did the US fail to predict Pokhran-II? Satellites worth billions were used to spy on Pokhran at all times, according to well-documented evidence. 

 

•    In fact, four satellites hovered over Pokhran, allegedly capable of counting the number of green patches worn by Indian Army soldiers on their fatigues. "Billion Dollar Spies" was their moniker. All India had against them were the Indian Army's "Regiment 58 Engineers."

 

•    These men had a year and a half to practise what they were supposed to do, which is a little-known fact. Every action was meticulously planned and meticulously executed. Every aspect of the mission had been carefully considered by the forces. India's access to cutting-edge satellites provided crucial information on what could and couldn't be seen from space. Scientists only worked on test sites at night, when satellites couldn't capture clear images due to the lack of light. 

 

•    As the sun rose higher in the sky, everything was placed exactly as it had been the day before. The next day, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts downloaded images from the satellites, it appeared that not a single strand had been moved. Additionally, sand was aligned towards the direction of the wind in areas where holes were dug. Because unaligned sand could have signaled activity, this eliminated suspicion.

 

•    But satellites weren't the only thing that could jeopardize the mission's secrecy. It was old news that the CIA was spying on communications. To combat this, code words for shafts were used. The name "White House" or even "whisky" was given to one shaft, while the name "Taj Mahal" was given to the other.

 

•    When DRDO and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) scientists came to Pokhran, they went undercover and dressed in army fatigues. Scientists were given fictitious names. 

 

•    The name of APJ Abdul Kalam was changed to Major General Prithvi Raj, and Rajagopala Chidambaram was given the codename "Natraj." The overuse of code words was so efficient that one senior scientist was said to have complained that the code words were more difficult to understand than physics calculations.

 

•    To protect the mission's secrecy and prevent leaks, India had to keep its own officials in the dark at times, including George Fernandes, the then-Defense Minister, who was not informed of a secret meeting between Vajpayee, Kalam, and Rajagopala Chidambaram (then-Atomic Energy Secretary) to discuss nuclear weapon tests.

 

•    Many people believe, however, that India created history in return. So be it if secrecy was the price. Only a few ministers were aware of the tests prior to their detonation. Lal Krishna Advani, George Fernandes, Pramod Mahajan, Jaswant Singh, and Yashwant Sinha were among the names on the list. 

 

•    The CIA was completely unaware of the tests until Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's then-Prime Minister, announced the achievement on television. 

 

•    The New York Times was blamed by US officials, who claimed the newspaper had published an article claiming the CIA was spying on India's nuclear test sites and had leaked information about the presence of US spy satellites above Pokhran. 

 

•    These leaks seem to have given India a heads-up. If there is one thing the US should learn about India from all of this, I believe it is that India is very good at keeping secrets. The nuclear tests may have taken place a little more than 17 years ago, but it's important to remember that Pokhran-II would not have been the success it is today if it hadn't been for the scientists and the government working together. Apart from the Kargil victory, Pokhran was one of Atal Bihari Vajpayee's most significant accomplishments.